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Résumé
Our aim in this article is to study the relation between earnings of French universities
graduates and some characteristics of their universities. We exploit data from the Céreq's
 Génération 98 survey, enriched with information on university characteristics primarily from
the ANETES (yearbook of French institutions of higher education). We employ multilevel
modeling, enabling us to take advantage of the natural hierarchy in our separate datasets,
and thus to identify, and even to measure potential eﬀects of institutional quality. Since we
take into account many individual students characteristics, we are able to obtain an income
hierarchy among the diﬀerent disciplines : students who graduated in science, economics or
management obtain the highest earnings. Below them, we ﬁnd students who graduated in law,
political science, communication or language and literature, while the ones who graduated
in social studies earn the lowest incomes. On the institutional level, we ﬁnd two signiﬁcant
quality eﬀects : the ﬁrst is from the socioeconomic composition of the university's student
population, and the second eﬀect is from the university's network in the job market. These
last two results remain stable when we examine subsamples of universities according to their
dominant teaching ﬁelds, except for universities that are particularly concentrated in science.
Keywords : Demand for schooling, educational economics, human capital, salaries wage
diﬀerentials, school choice
JEL classiﬁcation : C29, I23, J31
Introduction
While the French ﬁnancial eﬀort in terms of education is higher than the average of the OECD
countries, it is essentially concentrated in secondary schooling where the cost per pupil is nearly
the same as in the United States. On the other hand, in higher education the cost per student is
noticeably below the OECD average and inferior by half to the level in the United States. This
lesser investment in higher education is in part linked to the dual structure of the French higher
educational system : on one side are the post-high-school preparatory classes, followed by the elite
Grandes Écoles, either public or private but overwhelmingly autonomous, that select a very small
proportion of students for admission to this branch of higher education where they are oﬀered
training at relatively high expense. On the other side are the universities, quasi-exclusively public,
oﬀering training without the least selection at admissions, with very low per student expense,
practically not ﬁnanced at all by tuition, which is lower still. The cost per student in the ﬁrst
year at a French university in 2006 was below 8,000 euros, whereas it was nearly 14,000 euros in
the ﬁrst year of a post-high-school preparatory class for elite schools. To these diﬀerences in cost
are added the quite appreciable diﬀerences in returns to education - to the advantage of the most
selective educational tracks (Gurgand and Maurin, 2007). These cost diﬀerences lead to specula-
tion about the quality of education in the universities, representing more than 60% of students
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enrolled in French higher education and more than 80% of the diplomas awarded at the B.A./M.A.
and B.S./M.S. levels. The question is all the more urgent that new programs of reform for higher
education recommend granting more autonomy to these universities, which until present have been
quite tightly controlled by the Ministry of Education. It is appropriate to question the capacity of
these institutions to promote the value of their graduates' training on the labor market, which is
a necessary element for regulating the agency or mandate relationship between the State and the
universities (Cohen, 1997).
A double question arises nevertheless about the speciﬁc eﬀect in the labor market of attending
a given university institution and about explaining that eﬀect by variables relating to educational
quality. In various countries, the economic literature on the returns to schooling concerning quality
eﬀects of secondary or university institutions frequently presents weak or insigniﬁcant results for the
diﬀerent educational inputs (ﬁnancial resources per student, teacher quality) and for the outputs,
be they average earnings or returns to schooling (Rumberger and Thomas, 1993). The low level of
autonomy of French universities leaves the institutions relatively little room for maneuver to the
extent that the greater proportion of their ﬁnancial resources is allocated by the State according
to the number of students enrolled in each degree track (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 1998 ; Trannoy,
2006). Certain universities have succeeded in diﬀerentiating themselves from the others by speciﬁc
policies linked to their educational oﬀerings, their size, their location, their research specialization
or their relations with the economic environment. However, do their graduates beneﬁt from the
eﬀects of such diﬀerentiated quality when entering the labor market ?
In this research, we propose to oﬀer a few elements of an answer to this question, based on
a retrospective survey concerning the ﬁrst three years of professional activity of youth who left
the French educational system in 1998. Beginning with a sample of 55,000 youths, we selected the
individuals leaving the university who had successfully completed three, four or ﬁve years of study
after the Baccalauréat 1. These individual data are paired with administrative data drawn princi-
pally from the ANETES (yearbook of French institutions of higher education). These latter furnish
information on the institutions' resources, notably ﬁnancial, as well as on certain characteristics of
their educational oﬀerings.
This article is divided into four parts. We present in the ﬁrst part certain strands of the eco-
nomic literature, which enable us to establish the link between the institutional eﬀect and the
remuneration of graduates. In the second part, we introduce the data exploited. In the third, we
describe the econometric methodology employed, which lies in the domain of multilevel models.
Finally, in the fourth, we present the principal results obtained during our empirical study, be-
fore introducing several elements in conclusion on the existence of an institutional eﬀect and its
explication by characteristics that are speciﬁc to French universities.
1 Schooling Eﬀects and Earnings
1.1 Empirical Studies on the  Quality of Education-Earnings Link
After the work of Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974), an abundant empirical literature in the
economics of education focused on the link between the number of years of study and earnings.
Regardless of the methods and data employed, this research generally was in agreement on the
existence of positive returns to education that can nevertheless vary from 5% to 15%, and sometimes
by more. It is appropriate to clarify somewhat the term  returns to education . Indeed, there exist
two types of returns to schooling : private returns and social returns. By private returns, what must
be understood is the ﬁnancial gain that will beneﬁt the individual, and only him ; whereas, social
returns from the proﬁt accruing to the society as a whole from the investment of individuals in
training. In this study, we study only private returns to education. The estimation of these returns
in diﬀerent countries, essentially based on the data from the OECD (2003, 2006) - for a synthesis,
see Maguain (2007) - permits the construction of international comparisons so as to draw lessons
1. The French Baccalauréat, designated  Bac , is a national diploma sanctioning the studies completed in the
secondary school system (Lycée and Collège), corresponding to an American high school diploma, plus a varying
amount of American university credits, which may be obtained through  Advanced Placementexaminations.
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for public policy, or at least for good practice. France's position in such comparisons has evolved
over time : slightly above the 11.8% average of OECD countries in 2003 with returns in the range
of 12.2%, they were in the order of 8.4% in 2008 as compared to the 12.2% average, again based on
OECD data. It will be, however, diﬃcult to compare our results to these ﬁgures inasmuch as the
ﬁeld of the research is diﬀerent since we only consider university graduates with a national diploma,
corresponding roughly to American degrees between the Bachelor of Arts/Science and Master of
Arts/Science levels 2, therefore requiring from 3 to 5 years of study beyond the French  Bac ,
while the OECD's study takes into account all graduates from higher education. Moreover, this type
of report is not concerned with the diﬀerentiation of diplomas between universities ; and yet, the
content of a year of study - even though it may nevertheless correspond to a national diploma - is not
necessarily the same everywhere, which begs the question of the quality of education. Intuitively, it
is possible to imagine a relation between the level of ﬁnancial resources invested by the educational
institution and the returns to education. However, as early as 1966, the Coleman Report pointed
to the weak eﬀect of resources invested in public schools on pupils' achievement. Subsequently,
numerous empirical studies searched for the presence of eﬀects linked to institutional resources
and the educational quality on student achievement, notably using the data from standardized
achievement tests. This quality eﬀect was linked to diﬀerent inputs in the educational production
function : spending per pupil, class size, pupil-teacher ratio or teachers' educational level. The
empirical studies led to nuanced results : while some defended the existence of a rather positive
eﬀect (Greenwald, Hedges and Laine 1996), others globally found an absence of signiﬁcant eﬀects
(Hanushek 2003).
The question of students' professional prospects also arose. In conformity with the theory of
human capital, it would be reasonable to expect that the quality of education should improve the
returns to certain educational tracks. However, the results of empirical studies on the connection
between the quality of education and earnings led to a contrasting assessment. Using earnings
data from the 1980 United States Census, Card and Krueger (1992) showed that the returns to
a supplementary year of education were greater for average individuals in areas that had devoted
greater resources to education. They used variables on educational quality in American states at
diﬀerent dates and tested their eﬀects on the returns to education for several cohorts. Heckman
et al. (1996), however, qualiﬁed the preceding results. Using American census data yet again, but
also utilizing more recent statistics, the authors demonstrated that taking into account variables
related to the regional labor supply and demand broadly reduced the eﬀect linked to the quality of
education. In reality, the links between school quality and the returns to education only begin to be
truly signiﬁcant at the level of higher education. The results of Betts (1995), using in this instance
information on the level of each school, led to the rejection of the hypothesis of an eﬀect linked to
school quality, at least as it was measured in the inquiry 3, while the percentage of disadvantaged
students, as well as the school drop-out rate, were negatively correlated with salary. The review
of the literature on school quality and salary proposed by Betts (1996) globally conﬁrmed the
following results : the link is in general signiﬁcant only when the dataset on school quality had
been aggregated at the state or district level, and this, for the cohorts born before 1960. By using
data relative to Italian universities, Di Pietro and Cutillo (2006) established an ambiguous relation
between the quality of institutions and the professional position of young graduates in the labor
market, which seemed overwhelmingly dependent on the choice of their  performance indicator .
They also isolated a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of the quality of research on the fact of having
a post corresponding to the level of qualiﬁcation for men and for women, as well as a positive
eﬀect of research on earnings for men. On the other hand, the eﬀect on earnings of the quality of
teaching, measured by a composite indicator including notably the student-professor ratio, had a
negative sign, which led to questioning of the pertinence of this last indicator. They concluded that
2. More precisely, the highest diplomas in our sample are the Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies (DEA) and the
Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures Spécialisées (DESS), usually requiring 5 years of study after the French Bac.
3. The author notably selected : the ratio of full-time teachers to pupils, the salary of the beginning certiﬁed
teachers with a B.A. degree, the percentage of teachers having at least a Master's degree or higher, as well as variables
concerning the number of books in the library, a dummy variable of 1 if 7 vocational curricula were available at
the school, the percentage of young Afro-Americans, the number of teachers who had left the establishment in the
preceding year for reasons other than death or retirement.
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the variable selected to qualify research undoubtedly captured a reputational eﬀect, as well as part
of the eﬀect linked to the quality of the teaching imparted, a search for quality ensuring a renewal
and regular updating of knowledge. From the corpus of microeconomic research in this area, we
will bear in mind that the conclusions vary according to the inputs selected to deﬁne this quality
eﬀect, the most robust ﬁnding being the level of the teacher's diploma. Altonji and Dunn's (1996)
approach is more original to the extent that they used the data on children from a same family
to study the eﬀect of the quality of the American secondary teaching institutions on earnings. By
using this type of data, the authors were able to free themselves from the bias in the choice of
schools, which may be related to the family environment 4. Their results validated the existence
of an eﬀect of institutional quality on earnings, but not on the returns to education through the
positive eﬀect on earnings of variables such as the diploma of the teachers, the ratio of the number
of pupils to teachers, or still the level of expenditure per child in school.
Other research employed multilevel models to permit the enrichment of individual data by
institutional data. Rumberger and Thomas (1993) concentrated on the returns to a single diploma
in American higher education, the bachelor's degree, and this, from individual data bearing on
15,082 diplomas delivered by 404 colleges. The multilevel analysis, similar to the method used in
following sections of our study, allowed them to reveal the eﬀect of institutional characteristics on
salaries for diﬀerent academic disciplines. They showed that the average selectivity at admissions
to the institution, measured by means of the SAT test, aﬀected the salary of the youths for
the majority of disciplines. On the other hand, their results do not suggest the presence of an
unfavorable eﬀect of the socioeconomic composition of the student body for youths from minorities.
As for the eﬀects linked to the institution's resources, they varied greatly according to the discipline
and were often not signiﬁcant, when they were not counterintuitive. Thus, the student-teacher ratio
or the proportion of part-time students had a positive eﬀect on the remuneration of graduates in
the sciences and in education. The results Tobias and Li (2003) obtained from the data on youths
passing through the American secondary educational system were more conclusive, notably in what
concerns the presence of a school-quality eﬀect. They showed that the level of teachers' diplomas,
namely of having a Master's degree or not, increased without ambiguity the revenue and returns to
the years of study after secondary education. They also concluded that there existed an eﬀect from
the socioeconomic composition of the student body, measured by the eﬀect of family revenue, on
the remuneration of youths. However, the authors mentioned that the greater part of the variance
among institutions could not be explained by their modeling.
1.2 Structure of French Higher Education and Schooling Eﬀects
The research reviewed in the preceding paragraph does not make it possible to establish wi-
thout ambiguity a positive link between the quality of educational institutions and the earnings
of graduates, although it does seem that this link appears to be more founded for higher educa-
tion. In France, to our knowledge, no study has attempted to reveal this type of relation. The
absence of homogenous information concerning institutions, in particular on the employment of
their graduates, constitutes a ﬁrst obstacle. In addition, the institutional speciﬁcities related to the
structure of higher education and the labor market may reinforce the limits of the analysis. We
present here a few of these characteristics, which are not all exclusively applicable to the French
case.
In a forthcoming article, Brodaty, Gary-Bobo and Prieto (2008) study the eﬀect of having to re-
peat a year of schooling on the access to employment and on the earnings of graduates from French
higher education. In particular, they integrate the clearly endogenous dimension of the length of
studies, and furthermore exploit this endogeneity to deduce the impact of having to repeat a school
year on professional job opportunity. Moreover, the presence of numerous control variables enables
them to obtain an estimation of the returns to schooling that is the least biased possible, with a
surplus salary per supplementary year of study in the vicinity of 7%. The original methodology
they employ rounds out a framework for discussing the consistency of the  signaling theory"
4. They also showed that the choice of institution is not connected to speciﬁc aptitudes of certain children within
each family.
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proposed by Spence (1973) with the reality of the recruitment process.
Since the structures of American and French higher education diﬀer widely, the comparison
between American and French universities therefore is not self-evident, especially in terms of study
costs and admission selectivity. It may be thought that the selective aspect of access to universities
reinforces the logic of ﬁlters in the United States. The American system may generate  cream-
skimming behavior (Epple and Romano, 1998), which will enable the most selective universities to
attract the best students. The eventually positive eﬀect that the university may have on the returns
to education might correspond in part to its level of selection, which is less clear in the French
case. For French universities having little autonomy and working under the  San Remo norms
that have an equalizing inﬂuence, the competition in attracting students is not as intense as in
other countries. In addition, the Law prohibits universities from applying the principal of selection
at admittance, while at the same time tolerating a few exceptions. However, the selection process,
spread out over the whole degree program (Vincens and Krupa 1992), can make it possible both
to recognize progressively the best students and to discourage the others. Competition will rather
take place, beginning at the B.A. or B.S. and Master's degree levels, when the students are more
mobile.
Then, when considering earnings, another diﬃculty appears that is linked to numerous factors
unrelated to education and that depends particularly upon the degree of labor-market regulation or
segmentation. The structure of the labor market, as well as geographical factors tied to the demand
for labor, can largely inﬂuence salaries, as Heckman et al. (1996) emphasized in the analysis they
carried out on educational data originating in various American states. For the graduates of higher
education, the development of the service sector and the polarization of the labor market in certain
urban areas, linked to the presence of corporate headquarters of major ﬁrms or to the existence of
activities with high added value, will aﬀect the labor supply and the associated remuneration. In
addition, matching processes in the labor market may vary in function of the evolutions of supply
and demand for labor, which generate problems of poor spatial matching in certain cases. The risk
that one runs here is to attribute a spatial speciﬁcity of the labor market to an institutional eﬀect.
It is also appropriate to examine the conditions of choice of certain institutions by the students
in France. Indeed, parents' social capital may inﬂuence their children's educational trajectory by
giving priority, for example, to institutions which they know have a better reputation, taking ad-
vantage of privileged information. Parents can also intervene by being able to ﬁnance more easily
geographic mobility during the course of study. The ﬁnancial aspect will be that much more impor-
tant when the institutions practice selection during the course of study because the families will be
able to bear the higher costs of education and thus limit salaried activities during studies, whose
negative eﬀects on achievement in higher education are known. Subsequently, these diﬀerences in
social capital can have a determining eﬀect as well on the explanation of the diﬀerences in earnings
of young graduates. Hence, having a father who is a manager may in the ﬁrst instance enable the
youth to ﬁnance his studies in the most attractive establishments, then in a second stage, to gain
access to networks and to information facilitating access to the best-paying jobs. Beyond the eﬀect
of social capital on the individual, one may wonder as well if there exists an eﬀect of socioeconomic
composition of the student population within certain universities. For one reason, universities are
inscribed in speciﬁc socioeconomic and cultural environments, on which will depend the demand
for labor present in each region. This eﬀect of the population materializes at the educational level :
a positive environment can stimulate productivity in school, and inversely in the case of negative
surroundings, as the research of Goux and Maurin (2005) demonstrated for secondary education.
The scholastic and social characteristics of undergraduates may then inﬂuence the academic en-
vironment of the university and subsequently aﬀect the information of graduates on the labor
market. One may think, for example, that network eﬀects could bring beneﬁts more broadly to the




In this study, we principally make use of the data generated by the Céreq's 5 Generation
98 survey. This survey, carried out in the spring of 2001 on the entire population of students
terminating an initial education in 1998, with the objective of studying the professional integra-
tion of a generation of youths who entered the labor market in the same year. In 1998, 742,000
young people left the educational system. Among these numbers, 168,000 came from a university or
from an associated establishment, and more particularly for the population that we are studying,
112,000 held a university diploma at the B.A./B.S. or M.A./M.S. levels. The Céreq has done a
more recent survey,  Generation 2001 , carried out in the spring of 2004 on students who had left
the educational system in 2001. However, the comparatively modest number of respondents in this
last survey did not enable us to exploit it in this article, which is why we used the data from the
preceding generation. The initial sample was constituted of 55,000 individuals, representative of the
742,000 outgoing students. We retained for this study a subsample corresponding to those leaving
the universities (N = 15,895 individuals), without including the university engineering schools or
university technological institutes. Then, we selected among this population only the individuals
who had validated between three and ﬁve years of higher education (N = 7,205), which is to say,
with at least a B.A./B.S. and at most a Master level degree, DEA or DESS 6. Many of the youths
who left the university after having validated less than three years of study were in a situation of
academic failure, and their professional integration was especially diﬃcult. In addition, the indi-
viduals who had validated more than ﬁve years of higher education also constitute a population
whose professional integration is speciﬁc : since public sector research is a natural professional pros-
pect for holders of doctoral degrees, their salaries therefore have a tendency toward equalization,
thus losing their exploitable variability. We then withdrew from the sample the individuals who did
not reside in France at the time of the survey (N = 7,122 individuals). Lastly, since the purpose of
our study is to link the institutional eﬀect to the salaries of outgoing university students, we have
selected only the individuals who had in fact an employment in the spring of 2001 (N = 6,091), for
whom the working time was correctly documented (N = 5,905, of whom 575 working part time).
For practical reasons, we have voluntarily eliminated individuals from universities for which we
have less than 15 observations. In the end, our sample consisted of 5,883 individual observations,
belonging to 73 universities, which can be grouped into four categories according to their dominant
discipline(s) - science and health science, multidisciplinary with a medical component, multidisci-
plinary without a medical component, service sector. It is appropriate to mention here the presence
in our sample of individuals from a university that openly applies selection at admissions.
In the framework of our analysis of the education-earnings relation, we have included numerous
variables concerning individuals as much as institutions. The method of modeling employed (to be
described in the following section) enables us to situate ourselves at the level of individuals as well
at the level of universities, and thus to be able to obtain the estimation of eventual institutional
eﬀects.
2.2 The individual variables
The variables selected concerning individuals were for the most part generated by the Gene-
ration 98 survey and linked to academic and sociodemographic characteristics of youths holding
B.A./B.S., M.A./M.S. or DEA or DESS diplomas, augmented by variables for experience in the
labor market and seniority in employment. Following the example of the usual methods in the
literature on earnings functions, we thus introduced for the individual, the number of years of
study - whose estimated coeﬃcient makes it possible to obtain the returns to education - senio-
rity in the employment, as well as the experience in the labor market (experience prior to the
5. Céreq : the French Center for Research on Education, Training and Employment.
6. The so-called  LMD reform (Licence-Master-Doctorat) has arrived in the meantime, so that instead of a
DEA (Diplôme d'Études Approfondies) or of a DESS (Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures Spécialisées), we speak today
of a Master degree, eventually indicating its orientation, research or professional.
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employment held at the time of the survey) and their squared values to take into account the
concavity of income proﬁles, plus a gender variable. We included a range of dichotomous variables
to characterize the educational track to the diploma, which is to say : the exact sciences ; so-
cial sciences ; language and literature ; law, political science and communication 7 ; economics and
management, as well as a variable indicating if the training undergone was of the professional
variety (DESS, MSG, IUP) 8. Moreover, we also integrated information on the students' degree
course to take into account, at least partially, possible variations in the student selection pro-
cess, since the survey did not make available more precise information on school and university
achievement. We introduced as well various Baccalaureate series - L (Literary), ES (Economic
and Social), S (Scientiﬁc) or other types, the age at which the Baccalaureate was obtained (early,
normally, late), as well as the ﬁrst registration in higher education (admissions into a selective
or non-selective degree course). We equally took into account the family's socioeconomic context
by having recourse to the father's socioeconomic category, or failing that, to the mother's. Along
these lines, we distinguished four variables : managers and higher professions, intermediate pro-
fessions, farmers-craftsmen-shopkeepers-entrepreneurs, oﬃce employees and factory workers. So as
to integrate the consequences of spatial disparities in the labor market, we included a variable
indicating the unemployment rate in the individual's region of residence at the time of the survey
(measured as a diﬀerence from the national unemployment rate in that period, 8.6%). We also
included a variable indicating the share of managers and intermediate professions in the working
population of the zone of employment where the individuals lived at the time of the survey. These
two variables are from the INSEE's 9 employment survey. Finally, in the perspective of estimating
the earnings function, we only had at our disposal monthly salary data. So as to work with the
set of all salaried personnel, we therefore included four variables indicating the degree of part-time
work (the reference being full-time), which is to say : less than half-time, half-time, roughly 60%,
roughly 80% of full-time employment.
The examination of correlations between the variables for individuals made it possible to spot
several interesting aspects. Please note that we only comment here the correlations above 0.15-0.20.
First of all, we observed that the number of years of study is correlated with the type of Baccalau-
reate the individuals obtain, positively for the scientiﬁc track (0.21) and negatively for the literary
track (−0.18). We observed equally a correlation with the variables indicating the state of the labor
market, the share of managers and intermediate professionals in the working population (0.19),
as well as with the discipline of the diploma at graduation, in particular language and literature
(−0.25). Lastly, the number of years of study were very strongly correlated (0.51) with the type of
educational track, whether a professional-qualiﬁcation or not, which can be explained by the fact
that professional B.A./B.S. (licences professionnelles) were not created until after 1998 so that
there can be no individuals leaving the university from a professional track with a Bac+3 level in
the data. As can be seen, the number of years of study seemed to be correlated with many of our
variables for individuals, a result that could be expected in view of the results presented in the
literature (Brodaty, Gary-Bobo and Prieto, 2008).
Next, the characteristic of being a man was also correlated with two general types of Bacca-
laureates, scientiﬁc and literary (respectively 0.21 and −0.23), as well as with certain disciplines of
diplomas at graduation : hard sciences (0.25) and language and literature (−0.17), which simply
translated the reality of the masculine/feminine distribution of students at the secondary school,
then university levels. Turning our attention now to the registration in degree courses that are
selective after the Bac, a correlation emerges with the non-general Bac series (0.19), this category
of Baccalaureate holders had a stronger tendency than those from the general Bac series to en-
roll in IUT (Instituts Universitaires de Technologie) or in BTS (Brevet de Technicien Supérieur)
technical tracks. These same individuals then rather tend to be oriented towards diplomas in the
7. A single variable was used for these three disciplines. Moreover, we had recourse to the same interdisciplinary
groupings as the Ministry of National Education. It would have been more logic to class communication with
language and literature, a classiﬁcation we did test, without a modiﬁcation of results.
8. DESS (Diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées), MSG (Maîtrise de sciences de gestion), IUP (Institut
Universitaire Professionnalisé).
9. France's National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques : INSEE).
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exact sciences (0.18). As for the degree course of the Baccalaureate, we observed a foreseeable
correlation between the fact of obtaining the Bac late and obtaining a non-general Bac (other
series). Then, if we examine the working time, we noted a correlation between working hours that
are less than or equal to 50% of full-time employment and diplomas in language and literature,
indicating underemployment among these youths. The proportion of managers and intermediary
professionals in the working population is fairly logically correlated negatively with the regional
unemployment rate (−0.16). Finally, the discipline of the diploma was correlated with whether or
not the character of the diploma is a professional-qualiﬁcation, positively for diplomas in exact
sciences and economy/management/AES 10, negatively for diplomas in language and literature, as
well as in the social sciences.
2.3 The Institutional Variables
We likewise indentiﬁed the characteristics at the level of the diﬀerent universities that can
inﬂuence the remuneration of their diplomas on the labor market. Some of the indicators, moreover,
may be considered as inputs to the university's production function. This is notably the case for the
human and ﬁnancial means that are available within the university, which is to say : the student-
staﬀ ratio (number of students per teaching personnel), as well as the amount of resources in Euros
that are available per student, these two indicators were drawn from the ANETES 11 institutional
yearbook of higher education (1999). Moreover, so as to gauge the orientation of the university
in terms of research and professionalization, we selected the number of doctorates awarded per
1,000 students within the university under consideration and the proportion of professionalized
diplomas in the set of all diplomas awarded by the institution. Another indicator gives an idea of
the university's admissions policy concerning selection at the beginning of the degree course ; we
selected the cumulative ﬁve-year success rate at the level of the Diploma of General University
Studies (DEUG), usually obtained after two years of study. Finally, the last variable indicates
the socioeconomic composition of the institution : the study-grant rate (on social criteria and the
CROUS' 12 special assistance criteria), which made it possible to estimate the positive or negative
inﬂuence of the students among themselves as a function of their milieu of origin. This last indicator
was again drawn from the ANETES. As previously pointed out, we took into account the presence
in our sample of a university practicing selective admissions by introducing a binary variable.
The above variables were calculated with respect to their means for the whole set of universities
present in the sample under consideration for the purpose of characterizing a university's tendency
to place greater emphasis on research than the average, to award more professionalizing diplomas
that the average, etc.
Table 1  Institutional Variables
Variable Average Standard deviation Min Max
Doctorates per 1,000 students 5.87 4.46 0.08 19.63
Share of professionalizing diplomas 26.47 12.07 2.20 52.3
Ratio : number of students per teacher 24.41 8.00 12.54 49.1
Finantial resources per student 1488.38 672.4 528.86 4996.7
DEUG diploma success rate 80.26 9.75 41.8 100
Rate of Study grants 21.47 6.34 7.12 42.29
Source : Vie Universitaire and ANETES
Inspection of Table 1 gives an insight into the existing disparities among French universities.
The ﬁrst two indicators, the number of doctorates awarded per 1,000 students and the proportion
10. AES (Administration Économique et Sociale).
11. ANETES (Annuaire des établissements d'enseignement supérieur).
12. CROUS (Centre Régional des uvres Universitaires et Scolaires), an organization reporting to the French
Ministry of National Education that is the principal public source of ﬁnancing for university study grants, conferring
a social character to its assistance.
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of professionalized diplomas awarded, may be considered in the nature of the university's outputs,
resulting from choices made since its creation in the domain of research and professionalization of
training. These choices are extensively dependent on the length of the university's existence, as
well as on its endowments. Thus, the number of doctorates varied from 0.1 to 19.6 per 1,000, with
an average of nearly six doctorates presented per 1,000 students ; whereas, the share of professio-
nalizing diplomas varied from 2% to 52%, with an average on the order of 26.5%.
On the other hand, the human and ﬁnancial means per student may be considered as inputs to
the university's production function, even if they are also strongly constrained by certain characte-
ristics of the university, notably its dominant disciplinary orientation. In fact, the needs are not the
same for a university that has a large scientiﬁc or medical component as for predominantly tertiary
university. Therefore, we observe important diﬀerences in terms of ﬁnancial resources per student,
with a range of 1 to 9 in ﬁnancial resources between the two  extreme universities, and a range
of 1 to 4 in student-teacher ratios. Finally, the last two indicators also uncovered large disparities
between universities. The DEUG diploma success rate varied considerably between certain univer-
sities. It can even reveal an absence of selection policy during the degree course of the ﬁrst cycle,
in particular for a university displaying a 100% success rate. Inversely, a university presenting a
success rate below 50% proves to be extremely selective, the average cumulative 5-year success
rate being roughly 80%. The variation between universities in the rate of students on study grants
based on social criteria similarly reﬂected great heterogeneity of the socioeconomic composition of
the student population within French universities. The range in rates of study grants was from 1
to 6, which in percentage is from 7% to 42%, the average being 21%.
3 Econometric Modeling
To estimate the eﬀect of institutional characteristics on the salaries of young graduates, the
simplest strategy would have been to use OLS estimation. However, such a method would not
be appropriate to the extent that it would not capture the hierarchy present in the data : the
observations relating to individuals graduating from the same institution being correlated. For this
reason, in this study we used a multilevel model such as the one presented by Goldstein (1993).
We of course had at our disposal data that are structured on two layers : a ﬁrst level (individual),
and a second level (institutional). Our variables made it possible to describe the units on each
level, which is to say, the individuals and the universities. From this juncture, it became possible
to test if belonging to a given institution aﬀects the salaries of individuals who graduate from it,
and after that, to measure the eﬀect of certain characteristics of the universities on earnings. In
a ﬁrst step, we concerned ourselves with the eﬀect on the average earnings (via the intercept of
the earnings-schooling relation), which constitutes a direct eﬀect, then afterwards, we observed the
eventual eﬀect on the returns to education - that is, the slope of the education-salary relation -
and here we speak of an indirect eﬀect.
Formally, we write :
 yij the logarithm of the monthly salary earned three years after leaving the university by the
individual i from university j ;
 INDIV the matrix of k explanatory variables on the level of the individual (sex, number of
years of schooling, seniority, experience, educational track, academic discipline...), INDIVij
the vector containing the information relating to the individual i from university j ;
 EDUC the variable containing the number of years of schooling, INDIVM the matrix of
k − 1 explanatory variables other than EDUC, eventually indexed as INDIV ;
 ETAB the matrix of m explanatory variables on the level of the institution, ETABj vector
containing the information relating to the university j ;
 γ00 gives the estimation of the intercept of the model, making it possible to identify an
 average salary , conditionally on the variables introduced into the model ;
 β a vector containing the estimation of k (or k−1) parameters associated with the individual
variables ;
 γ a vector containing the estimation of m parameters associated with institutional variables ;
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 The constant term of the model varying between institutions, the variability estimated by
σ2u ;
 The residual variability on the individual level is measured by σ2e ;






permits the evaluation of the inter-institutional variance, which is the
part of residual variance that can be attributed to the institutional level ;
And in its structural form, the model is written in the following manner :
Model 1
level 1 : yij = β0j + βINDIVij + eij
level 2 : β0j = γ00 + γETABj + u0j
assuming that :
eij ∼ N(0, σ2e)
u0j ∼ N(0, σ2u)
eij ⊥ u0j
The reduced-form being :
yij = γ00 + βINDIVij + γETABj + u0j + eij
In a ﬁrst stage, we considered the case of an eﬀect of the level-2 variables (ETAB) on the constant
term alone β0j , which is to say the case of direct eﬀects. Moreover, the decomposition into two
parts of the error term can be seen from the reduced-form equation, separating the individual level
eij and the university level u0j , each part being normally distributed and independent from each
other. Model 1 is mixed, with a random eﬀect, which we supposed by hypothesis to be uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables.
In a second stage, we hoped to obtain an estimation of the eventual indirect eﬀects of insti-
tutional variables on earnings, via the return to education. We therefore withdrew the variable
EDUC (years of schooling) from the matrix INDIV . The estimation of the coeﬃcient β1j , which
now varies between universities in association with this variable, permitted us to obtain the return
to a supplementary year of education.
In its structural form, the model is thus written :
Modèle 2
level 1 : yij = β0j + β1jEDUCij + βINDIVMij + eij
level 2 : β0j = γ00 + γ0ETABj + u0j
β1j = γ10 + γ1ETABj + u1j
assuming that :
eij ∼ N(0, σ2e)
(u0j , u1j) ∼ N(0, T )







The distribution of the couple (u0j , u1j) is a bivariate normal distribution with variance-covariance
matrix T . While the diagonal terms τ00 and τ11 reﬂect the variations of the intercept and the
return to schooling, the presence of covariance term τ01 indicates the possible joint evolution of
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the intercept and the slope of the education-salary relation.
The error term at the institutional level is now composed of two terms, u0j and EDUCiju1j ,since
we consider that the intercept and the return to education both vary from one institution to ano-
ther.
In reduced form, model 2 is thus written :
yij = γ00 + βINDIVMij + γ0ETABj +
γ10EDUCij + γ1ETABjEDUCij +
u0j + EDUCiju1j + eij
The principal diﬀerence between model 1 and model 2 is that the ETAB variables now appear
twice : once aﬀecting the parameters γ0, giving an estimation of the direct eﬀects, and a second
time with the parameters γ1, multiplied by the variable EDUC, giving an estimation of the indirect
eﬀects.
4 Results
4.1 The Eﬀect of Individual Characteristics
The following commentary concerns Table 4 in annex.
While the purpose of this research is to obtain an estimation of eventual institutional eﬀects,
we have taken into account individual characteristics, whose eﬀects capture an important part of
the variability in earnings, and from which we can draw some lessons.
We obtained an estimation of the return to a supplementary year of schooling beyond the bac-
calaureate on the order of 10%, which is within the range of the ﬁndings of the various studies
mentioned in section 1.1. The coeﬃcient associated with the type of degree track shows that the
professionalization of training procures for the youths a salary advantage slightly above 5%. The
diploma's discipline had a strong impact on earnings : compared to social science graduates, the
youths graduating from departments of sciences, economy/management/economic and social ad-
ministration beneﬁt from the highest salary premiums, from +10.2% to +11.6%, which, because of
the standard deviations associated with these coeﬃcients, did not however permit the discrimina-
tion between the two groups of disciplines. Next, the diplomas in law and political science, as well
as degrees in language and literature, beneﬁt from a signiﬁcantly lower salary premium, on the
order of +5.5%, once again without being able to discriminate between these two degree tracks.
Beyond the diploma sanctioning completed training, other variables were introduced relating
to the school path of the youth during his studies. These variables may be considered as indicators
of students' potential scholastic capacities. Thus, those who were reoriented to the university after
studying in a selective degree course the year after the Baccalaureate beneﬁted from a +6.8% salary
premium. Similarly, the youths who got their baccalaureate early had a +2.8% salary advantage,
while symmetrically, those who got theirs late were penalized by −2.3%. Likewise, as compared to
holders of the baccalaureate S (sciences), those with baccalaureates in other series, frequently less
selective, receive remuneration that was inferior, by from −5.4% to −6.2% for the general series,
and as much as −7.5% for the other series, although we were not able to discriminate statistically
among all these degree courses.
The other variables we introduced into the modeling are relatively standard. The coeﬃcients
associated with the number of years of seniority in the ﬁrm (+5.5%) and of experience on the
labor market (+7.9%) were slightly higher than those generally found, which was related to the
fact that we were observing the beginning of professional activity (the three ﬁrst years, at the
most), a period during which seniority, and especially experience, oﬀer greatest salary advantage.
The coeﬃcients associated with the squares of seniority and of experience, on the other hand, were
not signiﬁcant. This result is related to the fact that we were observing our individuals for at most
three years on the labor market, while the squares of experience (and seniority) were introduced
to capture the concavity characterizing the evolution of the salary throughout the life cycle.
We observed an important gap in salary between men and women : in equal situations, men
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earned 13.3% more than women.
The variables associated with working time yielded expected results, but we were not really
able to exploit these estimates because we only had at our disposal working time data that were
approximate and that had been declared by the individuals themselves. Moreover, the variables
enabling us to control the state of the labor market showed that a regional unemployment rate
that was higher than the national average in the region where the youth worked reduced his salary.
Inversely, a high proportion of currently active managers in the employment zone had a positive
eﬀect on salary. Finally, the youths' social capital, measured here by the social status of the pa-
rents, inﬂuenced salaries : the remuneration of children of managers and higher professions was
signiﬁcantly higher than that of children of intermediate professions or again farmers-craftsmen-
shopkeepers-entrepreneurs - without being able to discriminate statistically between these last
categories - which were in turn signiﬁcantly higher than the remuneration of children of factory
workers and oﬃce employees, constituting the reference category from which the diﬀerences were
calculated.
Before analyzing eventual eﬀects of the institution, we considered a  model 0 , which did
not include any institutional variables. The interpretation of the residual variance of this model, in
particular of σ2u (corresponding to the institutional level), informed us about the interest of pursuing
our analysis by introducing the characteristics of universities into the model. This preliminary stage
also furnished us with an indication of the relative weight of the institutional characteristics with
respect to characteristics belonging to the individual through the correlation coeﬃcient ρ. The
estimations of variance are resumed in Table 2 below.
Table 2  Primary Variance
Empty Model Model 0 % Reduction
Variance level 1 : σ2e 0.1329*** 0.07284*** 45.19
Variance level 2 : σ2u 0.01766*** 0.001284*** 92.73




Signiﬁcance levels : *** : 1 % ** : 5 % * : 10 %
Empty model : model including only an intercept that varies between universities.
Model 0 : model including all individual variables, but no institutional variables.
Thus, after taking into account the characteristics of individuals, the residual variance at level
1 was reduced by approximately 45%, while the residual variance at level 2 was reduced by nearly
93%. The share of unexplained variance attributable to the institutions, which was valued at
11.73% in the empty model, fell to 1.73% upon the introduction of individual variables. Faced
with this ﬁnding, one might expect to obtain a weak eﬀect for university characteristics on the
salary of their graduates, both directly and a fortiori indirectly. In addition, we obtained an R2
with a value of 0.522, which was greater than the 0.30 generally found for the estimation of
 Mincerian earnings functions, indicating that the individual variables, other than the number of
years of schooling, seniority and experience, had practically the same explanatory power as these
fundamental variables.
4.2 The Schooling Eﬀect on Average Earnings
The ﬁndings discussed here concern the estimation of Model 1, described at the bottom of Table
4 in annex. Apart from the individual variables, the institutional variables were introduced se-
parately, then jointly, into the analysis, for those among them that were signiﬁcant. The results
concerning the separate introduction of these variables showed that only two of the six had a signi-
ﬁcant eﬀect on earnings. The rate of study grants based on social criteria was negatively correlated
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with salary (the eﬀect remained modest, −0.38 % per percentage of grants holders), which can be
analyzed as an eﬀect of the socioeconomic composition of the student population : one may think,
for example, that the parents with high social status are potential employers or that they know
potential employers, who will consequently favor the graduates of that university in their recruit-
ment. Another signiﬁcant result : the share of professional diplomas in the university also had a
second-level eﬀect on the remuneration of the youth (here too, the eﬀect was modest, +0.15% per
percentage of professional diplomas). This may be explained by a networking or signaling eﬀect
of the university with employers : the implementation of professional diplomas implies additio-
nal partnerships between the university and employers. Training periods, the obligation to bring
professionals into teaching, more frequent requests for continuing education for these graduates
enable the university to multiply its contacts among potential employers. This mediation permits
employers to conceive of this process as a means to reduce the uncertainty concerning the quality
of the graduates they hire. Furthermore, the binary variable indicating that the students were
graduates of the one university applying selectivity did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on salary 13.
The other variables displayed a reduction of the negative variance, which led us not to use them
in the rest of the analysis. Let us take note that neither the number of doctorates granted, nor the
student-teacher ratio, nor still the level of ﬁnancial resources per student were signiﬁcant, contrary
to what might have been expected concerning these three variables that could have reﬂected the
quality of the research and teaching in the universities. Similarly, the rate of success at the DEUG,
which illustrates the level of selection in the university's degree courses, did not have any eﬀect on
earnings. In total, the introduction of the two signiﬁcant level-2 variables, which is to say, the rate
of study grants and the rate of professionalizing diplomas awarded, caused a reduction of residual
variance on the order of 38.5% at the institutional level.
4.3 Schooling Eﬀects on the Returns to Education
The ﬁndings presented here refer to the estimation of Model 2, described in Table 5 in annex.
In the preceding section, we detected and quantiﬁed the institutional eﬀects on the youths' average
earnings, eﬀects that we qualiﬁed as direct : only the average level of salary (the intercept) varied
from on institution to another. We may nevertheless think that the characteristics of the institutions
might also inﬂuence the returns to education, in which case, we are speaking of indirect eﬀects. Let
us recall the notation introduced previously, in particular the notation relating to variance at the
institutional level. As soon as we are involved with indirect eﬀects, the returns to education will
vary between institutions, as will the intercept. The institutional level error term is now composed







Thus, τ00 is the variance term associated with the intercept, τ11 is the variance term associated
with returns to education, τ01 indicates the covariance between the intercept (or  average salary )
and the returns to education. Just as the analysis of the residual variance at the institutional level
(see Table 2) conditions the introduction of institutional variables, the analysis of the variance
associated with returns to education indicate whether we can pursue the modeling, by crossing the
university characteristics with the number of years of schooling, and thus to obtain the estimation
of eventual indirect eﬀects. The results presented in Table 3 show that the returns to education
actually do vary from one institution to another. In addition, the covariance term is signiﬁcant too,
indicated a joint evolution of the intercept and of the returns to education, the correlation being
−0.87.
The strongly negative value of this correlation indicates that the higher the average salary level
in an institution, the less a supplementary year of schooling in that university will be important.
13. However, we only had at our disposal 55 individuals who graduated from that university, which could explain
the absence of signiﬁcant eﬀect.
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Table 3  Estimation of Variance components in Model 2
Variable Estimation (10−3) Std. Deviation (10−3)
Variance intercept : τ00 4.689*** 1.932
Variance returns : τ11 0.567** 3.3
Covariance intercept/returns : τ01 -1.42* 7.49
Variance level 1 : σ2e 72.54*** 1.366
Signiﬁcance levels : *** : 1 % ** : 5 % * : 10 %
As we can see in Figure 1, the slope of the straight lines diminishes as the distance along the
ordinate increases from the origin. This result shows that the institutional eﬀect must be analyzed
more as a global premium on the average salary that beneﬁts the set of all graduates from a given
university, regardless of the diploma : B.A./B.S., Masters 1 or Masters 2. Globally, all the students,
whatever their university, will beneﬁt from continuing their studies by a supplementary year, so
great is the gain in salary indicated by the slopes of the returns to education curves, even if they
are at a university with a high average salary. However, in institutions with a lower average salary
premium, students will proﬁt still more by pursing their schooling.
The analysis of the direct eﬀects was extended to recuperate the indirect eﬀects linked to the
institutional variables. The results presented in Table 5 in annex do not allow us to demonstrate
such indirect eﬀects since none of the coeﬃcients associated with crossed variables (Professional
Diploma X Number of years of schooling and Study-grant holders X Number of years of schooling)
is signiﬁcant. In view of elements present in the literature, it was possible to expect to obtain an
inﬂuence of human and ﬁnancial means on earnings, not only directly through the average salary,
but also indirectly through the returns to education. On the other hand, we did not ﬁnd an eventual
inﬂuence of a university-networking eﬀect in the labor market or an eﬀect of the socioeconomic
composition of the student body on the returns to education. Therefore, the speciﬁcation we
selected was Model 1.
4.4 Analysis Broken down into University Categories
The composition of the disciplines taught in the universities varies substantially from one
institution to another, generally in function of historical and geographic speciﬁcities. As the data in
the ANETES (1999) yearbook show, the characteristics of the universities are appreciably diﬀerent,
notably in terms of means, according to their dominant discipline. So as to take this situation into
account, we used the Ministry of Higher Education and Research's classiﬁcation into ﬁve categories
as a function of the dominant discipline in terms of personnel within a given university. A ﬁrst
category includes the universities with a scientiﬁc and/or medical dominant. A second category
consists of the multi-disciplinary universities without a medical component. A third is comprised of
multi-disciplinary universities with a medical component. A fourth gathers together the universities
with a dominant in social sciences. The last incorporates the universities in which the law and
economics departments are the most important.
Within our sample, we have merged these last two categories, which essentially train students
for the service sector, and we did this to obtain relatively homogenous numbers of universities in
the diﬀerent subsamples of universities. Once we had done this division, we carried out the analysis
of the schooling eﬀects again, on each of the subsamples constituted in this way. The underlying
idea was to attempt to zoom to the ﬁnest level of detail possible in describing and characterizing
the universities. Ideally, we would have liked to have had at our disposal a suﬃcient number of
individuals who had graduated of the universities in each of department, as well as institutional
variables at this level of detail. Since we did not have access to these data, we restricted ourselves
to distinguishing the institutions according to their dominant academic discipline(s), through the
four categories described below.
On the whole, the results obtained with each subsample were comparable to those generated by
the estimation carried out on our total population (see Tables 6 and 7 in annex). As for the variables
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Figure 1  Illustration of the Negative Covariance between the Level of Salaries and the Returns
to Education (for each of 73 Universities
The chart is read as follows :
University A displays the highest level of salaries, but returns to education are among the lowest.
University B displays the lowest level of salaries, but the returns to education are among the highest.
University C exhibits one of the lowest levels of salaries, but the highest returns to education.
University D reveals the one of the highest levels of salaries, but the returns to education are the weakest.
The levels of salaries and returns to education reproduced here correspond to existing institutions, which we are legally
obliged not to name.
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concerning individuals, the direction of eﬀects remained the same, although their magnitude was
occasionally modiﬁed in moderate proportions (essentially for universities with dominant science
and medical components). The ﬁndings relating to the hierarchy of earnings among disciplines was
reproduced in each of the subsamples under consideration. However, it is appropriate to remain
prudent with respect to the estimations of surplus salaries in one degree track as compared to the
others since the structure of universities in a same category can vary without our knowledge of
detailed information on the subject. Concerning the existence and statistical signiﬁcance of the
schooling eﬀects, the results were more ﬁnely-shaded as well, pointing globally, however, in the
same direction as the analysis done with the full set of universities. For the universities with a
scientiﬁc and/or medical dominant, the characteristics of individuals capture the essential part of
the explained variance of earnings (the coeﬃcient of the variance associated with the intercept
being no longer signiﬁcant), and it was therefore not possible for us to detect schooling eﬀects. As
for the multidisciplinary universities, with or without a medical component, we observed a direct
eﬀect of the rate of professionalizing diplomas on earnings, although without being able to detect
an indirect eﬀect of this indicator. In the ﬁrst case, all of the variance is captured at the level
of the institution, while in the other case, the estimated variance associated with the returns to
education, when it becomes a random eﬀect, is no longer signiﬁcant. As we previously contended,
this ﬁnding illustrates the presence of networking or signaling eﬀects of the university with respect
to employers. Finally, in the case of universities with a dominant in disciplines for the service sector,
we again obtained networking or signaling eﬀects, completed by an eﬀect from the socioeconomic
composition of the student population, linked to the rate of study grants within the university,
which was the identical ﬁnding obtained with the full sample.
5 Conclusion
The relation between the quality of education and the earnings of graduates has brought forth,
particularly in the United States, an abundant microeconomics literature and numerous debates
about the eﬀectiveness of certain educational inputs. This research, moreover, has not created a
consensus on the link between the diﬀerent variables related to the quality of training in the ins-
titutions and earnings or the returns to education. Our research aimed at appraising the presence
of schooling eﬀects in the variance of earnings of graduates for the case of French universities
and then at attempting to explain the diﬀerences by characteristics that can be attributed to the
 quality eﬀects of the university training.
To reveal the schooling eﬀects, we enriched the Céreq's survey relating to the professional inte-
gration of youths leaving the educational system in 1998 with data on the characteristics of French
institutions of higher education. The use of multilevel models enabled us to account for the hie-
rarchical structure of our data. We have shown that the schooling eﬀects detected are principally
explained by two university characteristics. The ﬁrst is the rate of students receiving study-grants
conferred on social criteria among the student population. The students' social capital to attain
employment upon leaving the universities will be weaker, which reduces the recognition of the
university and of its graduates among potential recruiters. The second signiﬁcant characteristic
is the proportion of professionalizing diplomas in the university, which can also be interpreted in
terms of signals and information directed at employers. The universities having more professio-
nalizing diplomas are more well-known due to internships and to the participation of professors
with professional backgrounds in the training programs. While our results conﬁrm the existence of
schooling eﬀects, they are relatively weak in comparison to the individual eﬀects, linked notably
to the level of the diploma, type of degree course, academic path and the discipline of study. In
particular, we were able to draw up a hierarchy of salaries among the diﬀerent disciplines : it turns
out that the academic paths in economics-management on the one hand, and those in science on
the other, enable their graduates to obtain the highest salaries. Come next the academic paths
in political-science-law-communication, as well as in language and literature, and lastly, in social
sciences, which are the least remunerated.
In return, our research did not reveal any links between human or ﬁnancial means per student
on the graduates' earnings. Various reasons could explain this absence of relation. On the one
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hand, we did not have internal university data, notably on the Training and Research Units, the
UFRs (Unité de Formation et de Recherche, departments of universities), which may be conside-
red more discriminating because it is in fact at the level of UFRs that important diﬀerences in
human or ﬁnancial means as a function of academic discipline can be observed : the needs of a
scientiﬁc or medical Training and Research Unit are not comparable to those of a UFR in social
sciences. The introduction in the last part of this article of a classiﬁcation of universities according
to their dominant academic disciplines seemed to indicate diﬀerences between science and medical
universities and the others. On the other hand, our data concern students having left the university
in 1998. Since then, however, the extension of the professionalization of diplomas and of life-long
learning, the LMD diploma reform (Licence-Master-Doctorat) and the modiﬁcations in the range
of diplomas oﬀered, as well as the implementation of the law on the autonomy of universities may
lead to an evolution of these preliminary ﬁndings.
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Table 4  Direct Eﬀects on Earnings
Variable Estimation (%) Std. Deviation (10−2)
Intercept 6.640*** 2.57






Regional unemployment rate -1.559*** 0.1969
Share of managers and intermediary prof. in active pop. 0.5770*** 0.0633
Bac : Admitted to a selective course 6.824*** 0.8382
Bac : S (Scientiﬁc) reference
Bac : Other series -7.559*** 1.364
Bac : L (Language and Literature) -5.500*** 1.180
Bac : ES (Economic and Social) -6.146*** 1.052
Bac : Normal age (réf)
Bac : early 2.774*** 1.010
Bac : late -2.262*** 0.8371
Full-time reference
Part time : < half time -82.48*** 2.796
Part time : half time -54.79*** 1.917
Part time : 60 % -48.68*** 3.3317
Part time : 80 % -24.18*** 2.058
Parent's SES : Worker reference
Parent's SES : Superior 5.174*** 0.8581
Parent's SES : Intermediate 3.010** 1.200
Parent's SES : farmer-craftsmen... 2.423** 1.082
Discipline : Social Sciences reference
Discipline : Exact Sciences 10.22*** 1.341
Discipline : Language and Literature 5.456*** 1.305
Discipline : Law-Political Science-Com. 5.509*** 1.291
Discipline : Economy/Management/Social Econ. Admin. 11.63*** 1.278
Professionalized Degrees tracks 5.406*** 0.9192
Selective University 5.100 5.566
Professionalized degrees 0.1528*** 0.0509




Signiﬁcance levels : *** : 1 % ** : 5 % * : 10 %
Estimation in % except for intercept
Std. Deviation in 10−2 except for intercept
Reading exemple : Being a man increases salary by 13,32 %
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Table 5  Indirect Eﬀects on Earnings
Variable Estimation (%) Std. Deviation (10−2)
Intercept 6.6412*** 2.705






Regional unemployment rate -1.637*** 0.1975
Share of managers and intermediary prof. in active pop. 0.5657*** 0.0633
Bac : Admitted to a selective course 6.806*** 0.8371
Bac : S (Scientiﬁc) reference
Bac : Other series -7.646*** 1.362
Bac : L (Language and Literature) -5.441*** 1.179
Bac : ES (Economic and Social) -6.052*** 1.050
Bac : Normal age (réf)
Bac : early 2.855*** 1.1009
Bac : late -2.199*** 0.8366
Full-time reference
Part time : < half time -82.29*** 2.800
Part time : half time -54.77*** 1.915
Part time : 60 % -48.68*** 3.313
Part time : 80 % -24.16*** 2.057
Parent's SES : Worker reference
Parent's SES : Superior 5.156*** 0.8573
Parent's SES : Intermediate 2.984** 1.198
Parent's SES : farmer-craftsmen... 2.399** 1.082
Discipline : Social Sciences reference
Discipline : Exact Sciences 10.12*** 1.340
Discipline : Language and Literature 5.345*** 1.309
Discipline : Law-Political Science-Com. 5.415*** 1.289
Discipline : Economy/Management/Social Econ. Admin. 11.43*** 1.277
Professionalized Degrees tracks 5.412*** 0.9229
Selective University 4.694 5.467
Professionalized degrees 0.1765 0.1292
Professionalized degrees X Number of years of study -0.0070 0.0548
Study-grand holders -2.370 2.413
Study-grand holders X Number of years of study -0.073 0.0990
Variance level 1 : σ2e 0.07242*** 0.0014
Variance intercept : τ00 0.0047*** 0.0019
Variance Returns : τ11 0.0006** 0.0003




Signiﬁcance levels : *** : 1 % ** : 5 % * : 10 %
Estimation in % except for intercept and variance/covariance
Standard Deviation in 10−2 excpet for intercept and variance/covariance
Reading exemple : A year of experience increases earnings by 7,93%
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Table 6  Detailed Analysis by University Category - part 1
Category Scientiﬁc - Medical Multidisc. without Medical
Variable Estim. (%) Std. Dev. (10−2) Estim. (%) Std. Dev. (10−2)
Intercept 6.5230*** 0.052 6.6361*** 0.0475
Nb. years 10.26*** 1.294 9.861*** 1.249
Seniority 11.14*** 1.361 6.306* 3.384
Seniority2 NA 0.5529 0.9625
Man 18.02*** 1.763 11.40*** 1.337
Experience 11.30*** 1.604 9.552*** 2.852
Experience2 NA -0.587 1.269
Regional Unemp. -2.139*** 0.4286 -0.903** 0.3773
Managers and int. in active pop. 0.5537*** 0.1237 0.075*** 0.1269
Bac : selective course 7.163*** 1.831 7.735*** 1.440
Bac : S 5.856*** 2.129 ref
Bac : Other ref. -9.019*** 2.249
Bac : L ref. -5.5650*** 2.050
Bac : ES ref. -7.363*** 1.806
Bac : Normal Age ref. ref.
Bac : Early 5.259** 2.500 ref
Bac : Late ref -4.842*** 1.350
Full time (reference)
Part time : < half -120.01*** 10.93 -83.77*** 4.639
Part time : half -46.77*** 5.597 -52.30*** 3.108
Part time : 60 % -29.80*** 8.961 -62.28*** 5.477
Part time : 80 % -18.17*** 5.165 -28.42*** 3.530
Par. SES : Worker NA ref
Par. SES : sup. NA 0.0481* 0.0140
Par. SES : Int. NA ref
Par. SES : farmer... NA ref
Discipline : Human sci. ref ref
Discipline : Exact sci. 7.038** 3.372 11.60*** 2.243
Discipline : Lang. and Litt. réf 7.644*** 2.329
Discipline : Law/Pol. Sci./Com. 9.005** 4.383 5.157** 2.058
Discipline : Eco./Manag. 12.77*** 3.598 11.03*** 2.087
Professionalized degrees tracks 5.081** 1.983 9.066*** 1.597
Selective university NA NA
Prof. degrees NA 0.3884** 0.1546
Prof. degrees X Nb. Years NA NA
Study-Grant holders NA NA
Study-Grant X Nb. Years NA NA
Variance level 1 : σ2e 0.0702*** 0.0032 0.0722*** 0.0023
Variance level 2/Int : σ2u or τ00 0.0008 0.0041 0.0005 0.0004
Variance Returns : τ11 NA NA
Covariance Int/Returns : τ01 NA NA
Adjusted R2 0.468 0.517
Nindividual 1012 2033
Nuniversity 14 19
Signiﬁcance levels : *** : 1 % ** : 5 % * : 10 %
Estimation in % except for intercept and variance/covariance
Standard Deviation in 10−2 excpet for intercept and variance/covariance
Reading Exemple : A year of seniority increases earnings by 11,14 % for a student
graduating from a scientiﬁc-mediacl university
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Table 7  Detailed Analysis by University Category - part 2
Category Multi. with Med. Service sector
Variable Estim. (%) Std. Dev. (10−2) Estim. (%) Std. Dev. (10−2)
Intercept 6.6502*** 0.0418 6.6746*** 0.0570
Nb. years 9.659*** 1.087 11.04*** 1.192
Seniority 7.130*** 0.9885 7.678* 4.266
Seniority2 NA 0.5569 1.211
Man 12.02*** 1.473 12.65*** 1.801
Experience 7.330*** 1.243 11.60*** 3.920
Experience2 NA -1.072 1.678
Regional Unemp. -2.254*** 0.3369 -0.710 0.5494
Managers and int. in active pop. 0.8493*** 0.1434 0.4068*** 0.1145
Bac : selective course 5.777*** 1.606 6.287*** 1.920
Bac : S ref ref
Bac : Other -4.4742* 2.501 -12.44*** 3.396
Bac : L -5.155** 2.115 -6.817*** 2.445
Bac : ES -5.063** 1.997 -6.774*** 2.296
Bac : Normal age NA NA
Bac : Early NA NA
Bac : Late NA NA
Full time (reference)
Part time : < half -77.42*** 5.616 -78.37*** 5.046
Part time : half -58.20*** 3.699 -59.00*** 3.978
Part time : 60 % -39.04*** 6.022 -47.93*** 7.468
Part time : 80 % -17.31*** 4.301 -29.16*** 4.016
Par. SES : Worker ref ref
Par. SES : sup. 6.904*** 1.556 3.281* 1.749
Par. SES : Int. 3.741* 2.203 réf
Par. SES : farmer... 3.838* 1.990 réf
Discipline : Human sci. ref ref
Discipline : Exact sci. 7.257*** 2.117 19.39*** 5.489
Discipline : Lang. and Litt. ref 4.413* 2.398
Discipline : Law/Pol. Sci./Com. ref 5.933** 2.657
Discipline : Eco./Manag. 7.391*** 1.950 11.76*** 2.2696
Professionalized degrees tracks 3.927** 1.767 0.7958 2.210
Selective university NA 1.918 7.536
Prof. degrees 0.2925** 0.1333 0.2308* 0.1209
Prof. degrees X Nb. Years NA NA
Study-Grant holders NA -0.633** 0.2156
Study-Grant X Nb. Years NA NA
Variance level 1 : σ2e 0.06619*** 0.0024 0.0806*** 0.0033
Variance level 2/Int : σ2u or τ00 0.0029** 0.0014 0.0008 0.0007
Variance Returns : τ11 NA 0.0011* 0.0007
Covariance Int/Returns : τ01 NA -0.0026 0.0017
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.541
Nindividual 1607 1231
Nuniversity 22 18
Signiﬁcance levels : *** : 1 % ** : 5 % * : 10 %
Estimation in % except for intercept and variance/covariance
Standard Deviation in 10−2 excpet for intercept and variance/covariance
Reading Exemple : A year of seniority increases earnings by 7,13 % for a student
graduating from a multidisciplinary with medical university
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